Abstract-Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive technique that combines digital signature and public key encryption in one logical single step. Signcryption scheme is divided into certificatebased Signcryption scheme, and certificateless Signcryption scheme. In this paper we propose an identity based mutual authentication protocol that provides signed and encrypted communication based on Signcryption scheme between mobile devices that are limited in terms of computation power. The proposed protocol is based on Certificateless Signcryption, in which no Digital Certificate Authorities are used to manage user identities, their public keys, and certificate lifecycle. Our proposed protocol allows limited computation power devices to delegate identity validation that requires lots of computation and cryptographic operations to a third party. Our proposed scheme depends on (ECC) which has efficient delivery of security services and is better than exponential cryptography. Our proposed scheme also provides several security services such as, confidentiality, mutual authentication, integrity, unforgeability, non-repudiation, public verifiability and perfect forward secrecy.
Many signcryption schemes that demonstrated in [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] use certificate authorities (CA) to verify the validity of the identity associated to a certain public key. But these signcryption schemes have significant drawbacks such as large amount of computation and efforts, and computation costs associated with managing certificate authorities.
Several Certificateless Signcryption schemes that demonstrated in [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] have been proposed based on bilinear pairing, The main disadvantage of these schemes are an expensive cryptography primitive, lots of computation and energy costs ,and not efficient in constraint devices and mobile environment.
Many Certificateless Signcryption schemes that demonstrated in [14] [15] [16] have been proposed without bilinear pairing by using Modular Exponential operation, The main disadvantage of these schemes are Consumed a lots of computation and energy costs and Not efficient in constraint devices and mobile environment.
In this paper we propose a new scheme that guarantees a secure and efficient communication between devices that have computing power limitations. Our scheme is based on using Signcryption scheme to guarantee confidentiality and integrity of communication conducted by mobile devices. The proposed solution does not depend on using a pre-established Certificate Authorities, it depend on using participants identity to provide the required security services.
Our new Certificateless Signcryption scheme does not depend on modular exponential operations; it is based on using the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for better and efficient delivery of security services.
III. RELATED WORK
In 1976, the signature then encryption approach discovered and used to perform secure and authenticated communication. But this approach consumes a lot of computation and expands the message by introducing extended bits to it [1] . In 1997, the Yuliang Zheng proposed a new cryptographic primitive technique called Signcryption which combines both operations of digital signature and public key encryption in one logical single step with a cost smaller than that required by signature then encryption [3] . Several Signcryption schemes have been proposed over the years, each of them provides different level of security and computational costs.
In 2009, Toorani and Shirazi [2] introduced elliptic curvebased Signcryption scheme based on the hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). This scheme provides all of the security services such as, confidentiality, unforgeability, integrity, non-repudiation, forward secrecy and public key verifiability. The provided forward secrecy is partial forward secrecy under intractability of the ECDLP which is not perfect forward secrecy. The main difference between partial and perfect is the number of longterm keys that are compromised. The partial forward secrecy is satisfied if the adversary compromises the long term private keys of one or more specific entities (not all entities) does not compromise the session keys established in previous protocol runs involving those entities [4] , [17] . The perfect forward secrecy is satisfied if the adversary compromises the long term private keys of all entities, does not compromise the session keys established in previous protocol runs involving those entities.
All cryptographic models and schemes that demonstrated in [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] have proposed Signcryption-based schemes that depend on using the Certificate Authority (CA) to verify the identity of participants. Using certificate authorities raises many issues and problems related to identity and certificate management such as, identity and certificate lifecycle, in addition to the size of computation that needs to be performed in order to provide the functionalities of certificate authorities.
In 2008, Barbosa and Farshim [2] proposed the first Certificateless Signcryption scheme that solved all problems of certificate-based Signcryption, such as, management of certificates and key escrow problem.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME Throughout this paper, we propose an identity based authentication with Certificateless Signcryption. In our proposed scheme we don't use Certificate Authorities to manage user identities and their public keys. Our proposed protocol allows devices with limited computation power to delegate identity validation that requires lots of computation and cryptographic operations to a third party. Our protocol depends on elliptic curve cryptography and utilizes the following issues that considered computationally infeasible for adversary:
 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is defined as: given an elliptic curve E defined over finite field contains q elements (Fq), typically, the q is either a power of 2 ( or an odd prime number (p), let P and Q be two points on elliptic curve that( P Fq) of order n and a point Q Fq, where computationally infeasible to find the integer k, , such that Q = kP, the integer k is called the elliptic curve discrete logarithm of Q to the base P.
 Collision Attack Assumption 1 (K-CAA1): which states for an integer k, and , , given (P, xP, h0, (h1, ), ..., (hk, )) where hi and distinct for , the computing P is hard.
 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECDHP): which states for and , given (P, xP, yP) without x and y, the computing x.yP point that is hard [18] [19] [20] .
The proposed protocol consists of thirteen phases. The following steps describe the protocol and how it works.
A. System Initialization:
At this stage the Server (S) performs the following computations:
1. Chooses the elliptic curve equation E with order n. 2. Chooses a base point P with the order n over E where n×P = Θ and n is a very large prime number.
3. Chooses the private number q S as the private master key, where q S < n then computes the public master key Q S where Q S = q S ×P.
4. Chooses three one-way hash functions H1( . ) , H2( . ) , H3( . ) and a message authentication code MAC K (m).
5. Stores private key q S in a secure location and publishes the following domain parameters params = (F p , E, n, P, Q S , H1, H2, H3, MACk (m)).
The domain parameters of the proposed protocol be composed of a correctly elliptic curve equation E defined over a finite field prime F p with the Weierstrass equation that is formed as where F p, is a large prime number and .
FP:
Finite field Prime p.
E:
An elliptic curve defined on finite field FP with prime order n.
G:
The group of elliptic curve points on E. P:
A base point on elliptic curve E with order n that (n×P = Θ).
Θ: Point at infinity as (x, ∞).
n: Very large prime number.
The multiplicative group of integer's module p. The authentication server.
IDA:
The identity of the mobile device that called as Sender.
IDB:
The identity of the mobile device that called as Receiver.
IDS:
The identity of the server S; (wB,WB): The Receiver's private/public key pair, where WB = wB ×DAB.
DAB:
The partial private key to the Sender and Receiver.
:
The public key of Sender after encrypted by using the session key sk.
TA:
The time when Sender sent the message.
T' :
The time when S receives the message ∆T:
The interval of the valid time.
R:
The point on Elliptic Curve. Fig. 1 The common notations used in this paper Fig. 2 The Steps of our proposed protocol
B. Sender Registration:
In our protocol the sender is (Alice) and the receiver is (Bob). Sender wants to send a message to Receiver but before doing, Sender must register first at server S, System participants delegate an authority to the Server S to verify the credentials of any communication session participants and to perform mutual authentication between them. So, registration of the participants in server is required to enable the server to verify the identities of the participants. The sender registration process is performed as follows:
1. Sender sends her identity ID A to the server S. 2. Server S computes the digest h A = H1 (ID A ). 3. Server S computes static private key for Sender D A = .
4. Server S sends the private key for Sender in a secure way (for example by using Secure Socket Layer (SSL) based connection).
C. Verification of Sender and Server:
At this phase, Sender sends a login message to S and then S verifies the authenticity of the login message and generates a session key (sk) to be used in future to secure the communication between S and Sender. Then S computes the partial private key for Sender and Receiver as follows:
At Sender side: 1. Sender chooses a random number r A Where r A ϵ Z*n. 
D. Initialization of the Sender
After applying the mutual authentication between Sender and the Server S and creating the partial private key for Sender and Receiver D AB , Sender now creates the dynamic private and public key that will be used in Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt processes among Sender and Receiver via using the partial private key for Sender and Receiver D AB as the base point by performing the following steps:
1. Sender chooses random number w A as a private key where w A ϵ Z 
E. Verification of the Sender Public Key (At Server)
After generating the public key, Sender encrypts it by using the session key sk that was previously shared between Sender and Server. After that, Sender sends =Esk(W A ) to the Server S. Then the server derives the public key of Sender after decrypting by using WA=Dsk( ). The server can utilize the process of verifying the validity of Sender's public key to avoid the invalid curve attack by checking the following conditions: W A ≠ Θ, W A that should satisfy the defining equation of E and , Fp. if all of these conditions are not satisfied then the server aborts the public key.
In addition, The server can utilize the process of verifying the validity of Sender's public key to avoid the adversary to change the public key by checking the following conditions: If the Sender's public key that derived from the decryption process at Server the same Sender's public key that publish at Sender then the Server agree Sender's public key and publish. Otherwise, the Server aborts Sender's public key.
F. Receiver Registration
After the sender generates his/her public/private keys he/she should notify the receiver to generate his specific public/ private key by sending a notification message to receiver. The receiver must register at server to delegate authority to the Server S to verify the credentials of any communication session participants and to perform mutual authentication between them. This phase is similar to the second phase described before. The Receiver Registration process is performed as shown in figure3: Fig. 3 The receiver registration process
G. Verification of the Receiver and the Server:
This phase is similar to the third phase. It works as shown in figure 4: 
I. Receiver Public Key Validation (At Server):
After Receiver generates the public key, he can encrypt the public key by using the session key sk that is already shared between Receiver and Server. After that, Receiver sends =E sk (W B ) to Server S, Then the server derives the public key of Receiver after decrypting by using WB=D sk ( ). The server can utilize the process of verifying the validity of the Receiver's public key to avoid the invalid curve attack by checking the following conditions: W B ≠ Θ, W B should satisfy the defining equation of E and , Fp. if all of these conditions are not satisfied then the server aborts the public key. In addition, The server can utilize the process of verifying the validity of the Receiver's public key to avoid the adversary to change the public key by checking the following conditions: If the Receiver's public key that derived from the decryption process at Server the same Receiver's public key that publish at Receiver then the Server agree Receiver's public key and publish. Otherwise, the server aborts Receiver's public key.
J. Signcryption Phase
In this phase, Sender performs the actual and secure communication with Receiver by sending a message to Receiver. The message goes through Signcryption process to generate a signcrypted text that fulfills the functionalities of digital signature and encryption in a single logical step. It contains three parts R, Cipher text C and signature s and it might also contain a timestamp T. The process is performed as the following:
1. Sender chooses random integer number r where r ϵ Z*n or [1, n-1].
2. Sender computes the R point where R = r × D AB = (X R , Y R ). 
Sender computes
K = (r + ̃ wA) WB = (X K , Y K ) where ̃ = ⌈ ⌉ + (X R ⌈ ⌉ ) in which ⌊ ⌋ +1 is
K. Server Verification of the Validity of R
The server is delegated to verify the validity of R to avoid the invalid curve attack. The invalid curve attack occurs for points as an ephemeral public key that transmitted to other participant. The ephemeral public key is described in key of participant section. The server verifies the validation of R by checking the three conditions as:
1. R must not equal the point at infinity ≠ Θ. 2. R should satisfy the defining equation of E. 3. The X and Y coordinates of R must belong to finite field Prime as X R , Y R F p .
Then Server encrypt the R by using session key between Receiver and Server (sk), E sk (R) = ̅ ̅ .
L. Unsigncryption Phase
In this section we describe how the Receiver (Bob) cans Unsigncrypt the text that has been previously sent by the Sender (Alice). In this phase, Receiver receives the signcrypted text ( ̅ , C, s, T) from Sender and then performs the following steps: 
M. Judge Verification
When a dispute occurs between Sender and Receiver, for example, Receiver claims that he has received a signcrypted text from Sender and at the same time Sender denies that she sent the message. In this case, they need a third party to verify the claim of Receiver. There are two types for the third party; either the third party can be an Authentication Server or public user. If the third party is an authentication server, then Receiver sends to Server ( ̅ , C, s, T, M, k). The authentication Server performs a set of steps to judge upon Receiver claim as follows:
1. Server verifies whether Receiver is registered in the Server. If he is not registered, then Receiver's claim is rejected.
2. Server verifies whether Sender is registers in the server. If she is not registered, then Receiver's claim is rejected.
3. Server verifies from M=D k (C). If it does not satisfy, then Receiver's claim is rejected.
4. Server computes t =HMAC k (M ||X R ||ID A || Y R || ID B ||T).
Server verifies from Sender signature by checking this condition (s.D AB + R= t W A ). If this condition is satisfied, then
Receiver's claim is right. Otherwise, the Receiver's claim is wrong.
If the third party is public user, then Receiver sends ( , C, s, T, M, k, D AB ) to user. Any public user can perform a set of steps to judge on Receiver's claim as follow:
1. Public user registers in server 2. Public user request from Server to check the validity of Sender and Receiver. If Sender and Receiver are registered in server, then continue the next steps. Otherwise, Receiver is rejected.
Public user computes t =HMAC k (M ||X R ||ID A || Y R || ID B ||T).

Public user verifies from Sender signature by checking this condition (s.D AB + R= t W A ). If this condition is satisfied, then
After performing the public verification by public user, then Sender and Receiver must be revoked from the server and all related information must be deleted from the server. If Sender or Receiver need to send other signcrypted text after the dispute occurs, they need to re-register in the server to thwart any attack that might take place.
N. Participants Keys
Each participant has two pairs of keys; static and dynamic pairs of keys. The static pair of keys is created by server for each participant that is registered in it. The dynamic or ephemeral pair of keys is created by the participant. Each pair of keys consists of the public and private keys. The dynamic public key of participant varies according to the sender and receiver. In other word the dynamic public keys of participants are the same if the participants of protocol are the same and the dynamic public key for each one is different once the participant has changed.
The sender must verify the dynamic public key of the recipient by using the public key validation and vice versa but this operation is time consuming and its computation cost is high, so it is not suitable for resource constraint devices. Therefore the delegation of public keys validation for all participants to the server is so suitable for resource constraint devices and almost solves most of the problems.
The verification of ephemeral public key takes into account two points; the first verifies from possessing the right public key of the participants that corresponds to their private keys and the other one verifies from validation of public key to avoid the invalid curve attack.
The verification of possessing the right public key of the participants is done by using the symmetric encryption as AES that is recommended by NIST as a strong block cipher. The symmetric key that used is a session key sk generated between the participant and the Server. The participant encrypts the public key and sends it to Server. The server receives the encrypted public key and decrypts it and then checks if the same public key of participant that is published by participant or not. If differ, the server aborts the public key and the participant that have sent the public key.
The verification of public key validation is done to avoid the invalid curve attack by checking the following conditions: the public key ≠ Θ, public key should satisfy the defining equation of E and X, Y of the public key point Fp.
Upon receiving the point R in unsigncryption phase or through transit to server should observe the invalid curve attack problem. In addition, the invalid curve attack occurs in points as an ephemeral public key that is transmitted to other participant. So, the receiver or the delegated server must be verified by checking the following conditions: R ≠ Θ, R should satisfy the defining equation of E and X R , Y R Fp.
V. ANALYSIS
We demonstrate the advantages of our proposed scheme in terms of security strengths and we also analyze the computation cost associated with using our proposed scheme.
A. Security Analysis:
The main advantages of the proposed scheme from a security aspect are:
1. Using Signcryption to perform secure communication with minimum computation cost by taking advantage of the elliptic curve cryptography.
2. Using identity based mutual authentication instead of using certificate authority to verify the identity of the participants:
Most of Signcryption schemes use Certificate Authorities (CAs) to verify the validity of the identity associated to a certain public key. These Signcryption schemes have significant drawbacks such as large amount of computation and efforts and computation costs associated with managing certificate authorities. To solve these problems, we used identity based mutual authentication instead of using CAs to verify the identity of the participants. The identity based mutual authentication is a protocol that verifies the client's (Sender or receiver) and server's authenticity with lower computation cost. This protocol is implemented based on ECC which is efficient and practical for restricted constraint devices.
3. Resistance to the key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack:
In our proposed scheme there are two types of session keys. The first is the session key between user and Server, the second is the session key between the Sender and the Receiver. The KCI attack means that the adversary can obtain the private key of one of the parties involved in the communication and tries to impersonate the other honest party. In more details, if the adversary obtains the private key of the Sender, then he/she tries to impersonate the other honest party like the Receiver [21] .
In our protocol the session key between the Sender and the Receiver is created based on the following values: private key of Sender w A , the r of R and D AB . Considering that the values; r and D AB are secret values, then by only knowing the private key of the Sender this does not mean that the attacker can calculate the session key because he/she is still missing major information (r, D AB ).
On the other knowing the private key of Receiver is not enough to calculate the session key between Sender and Receiver, because the attacker still needs the values of D AB and R.
Attacking the session key between the Sender and the Server by impersonating the identity of Sender (knowing her private key) will not be successful because in addition to the private key, the attacker still needs to know the values of: M A , M S and K A . On the other hand attacking the session key between the Receiver and the server requires the values M B , M S and K B in addition to knowing the private key of Receiver.
In all cases, it's hard to calculate all information that can be used to calculate the session keys because it is very hard to calculate ECDLP, K-CAA1 and CDHA.
Resistance to the invalid curve attack
The invalid curve attack occurs with points such as ephemeral points that are transmitted to other participant without checking the validity of the point [22] . The point is considered valid if all of the following conditions are satisfied; 1) If the point does not equal the infinity point in elliptic curve.
2) If the point satisfy the defining equation of E.
3) The x and y coordinate have proper format of Fq element.
In our protocol the server is responsible of validating the ephemeral point's validity by checking on the previous conditions.
5. Forward Secrecy Forward secrecy means that the past established session key is protected even if the current secret key is exposed. Each end entity has two pairs of keys (public/private): one static pair (long term) generated by the server for each end entity, the other variable or ephemeral pair (short term) that the end entity create by itself. If a compromise of the long term private key of both Sender and Receiver occurs then this would not compromise the previously established session key. If a compromise of the long term private key of either "Sender or Receiver" and a compromise of the master key of authentication server occur then this would not compromise the previously established session key because using the H3 (ID A , T A , T S , M A , M S , K A ) or H3 (ID A , T A , T S , M A , M S , K S ) as a secret share and the adversary can't compute K S or K A from M S and M A because it is computationally unfeasible to solve the CDHA If a compromise of the short term private key of both Sender and Receiver occurs then this would not compromise the previously established session key because using the H (X K , ID A , Y K , ID B , T A , D AB ) as a secret share. In this case the adversary can't compute D AB as secret point shared between Sender and Receiver and the adversary can't compute K without knowing the R point which is encrypted at Alice with using the sk that shared between Sender and Server. And the adversary can't compute K because it is computationally unfeasible to solve the ECDLP and CDHA. Table I shows the security properties supported by existing Signcryption schemes along with the proposed scheme. Our proposed scheme simultaneously provides confidentiality, mutual authentication, integrity, unforgeability, nonrepudiation, public verifiability and forward secrecy. Then can reach to the correct key agreement to perform the unsigncryption. And they have another implicit authentication that demonstrated when receiver verifies the signature by checking (s.D AB + R= t W A ) condition.
B. Security Services:
3. Unforgeability: Unforgeability means that the adversary cannot forge a valid signcrypted message ( ̅ , C, s, T). This means that there should not be two signcrypted messages that generate the same plain text.
In order to forge a message the adversary should generate a valid ( ̅ , C', s', T'). R is a secret point protected all the way from sender to receiver, this means that the adversary cannot generate a forged message because he/she does not know the value of R. Assuming that the adversary knows the point R, then the valid forged signature should satisfy (tW A -sD AB = t'W A -s'D AB ') or equivalently (s' = s + (t' -t) w A ) so the knowledge of t, t', D AB and w A is necessary. To find the true value of t =HMAC k (M ||X R ||ID A || Y R || ID B ||T) and t' =HMAC k (M' ||X R ||ID A || Y R || ID B ||T), the adversary should know the session key k that requires knowledge of D AB, w A and r or D AB , w B and R. if the adversary knows w B then he/she cannot derive k until he/she knows D AB. Since D AB is a secret point between Sender and Receiver, then the adversary cannot forge the signature, and the adversary forged signature will be predictable at the unsigncryption stage because the following condition will not be satisfied the (s.D AB + R= t W A ).
4. Integrity: Integrity means that the content of the message cannot be modified only for authenticated user or originator of the message. In our scheme, we used several hash function that all guarantee the integrity as MAC and HMAC. concatenated with variable parameters is involved in the signature generation like t value, so any alter of message will change the signature.
5. Non-Repudiation: Non-repudiation means that the sender must not deny that she has sent a message after sending it and the receiver must not deny that he has received a message after receiving it. Unforgeability implies non-repudiation if there is no duplication of the signcrypted message. In our scheme it is computationally infeasible to forge the signature of participants without having D AB, w A and r for sender or D AB , w B and R for receiver.
6. Forward Secrecy Of Message Confidentiality: Forward secrecy means that if the current secret key for sender is exposed, then adversary cannot decrypt the signcrypted texts. Therefore, the messages are protected. The adversary can defeat the message confidentiality of the communication in two ways either by having: 1) D AB, w A and r. or 2) D AB , w B and R. 7. Public Verifiability: Public verifiability means that anybody can verify whether the message has been sent by message originator. When a dispute occurs between Sender and Receiver, such that, if Receiver claims that he has received a signcrypted text from Sender and Sender denies sending the message then the third party can verify the correctness of Receiver's claim. Public verifiability is described in details in the proposed scheme in judge verification section.
C. Computation Costs
In this section we compare between the computation cost of the proposed scheme and those of the other schemes. The other schemes are also certificateless Signcryption Schemes. Other certificate based schemes, introduced in Table 1 , have neglected the computation cost associated with the verification and symmetric encryption; therefore, they will not be part of our comparison.
The full computational cost of our certificateless Signcryption scheme is demonstrated as follows:
AT The Signcryption scheme is divided into two types, the certificate Signcryption scheme and the certificateless Signcryption scheme. The first one is using the certificate authority to verify the identity of participants [3] [4] [5] , [7] , [8] , [24] . The certificate authority has problems with managing the certificates because it requires a lot of computation and communication cost. The second one is certificateless Signcryption scheme, which is divided into three types depending on the type of implemented cryptography as bilinear pairing cryptography, exponential cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
The certificateless Signcryption scheme with pairing is demonstrated at [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . The pairing cryptography is considered as an expensive cryptography with relative computation cost is approximately twenty times higher than that of the scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group [25] .
The certificateless Signcryption scheme without pairing is demonstrated at [14] [15] [16] . Certificateless Signcryption scheme without pairing based on ECC achieves a desired security level with significantly smaller keys than those of required by exponential cryptography. As an example, the 160 bits key in ECC has provided the same level of security as 1024 bits key in RSA.
As a practical example, The Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication needs 83 ms and the modular exponentiation operation needs 220 ms for average computational time in the Infineon's SLE 66CUX640P. The Infineon's SLE 66CUX640P is a security controller that supports RSA (up to 1024 Bit) and ECC (up to256 Bit) over GF (p) [26] . In table II, we show a comparative analysis of different certificateless Signcryption schemes on the average computational time of major operations based on average computational time in the Infineon's SLE 66CUX640P security controller. In addition, at Signcryption and unsigncryption phase, we used the ̃ as the least significant half in binary representation of X R where ̃ = ⌈ ⌉ + (X R ⌈ ⌉ ) in which ⌊ ⌋ +1 is the bit length of n, and let a is bit length of ̃ . In [4] , the setting a as ⌈ ⌉ is providing the best trade-off among efficiency and security which explained as: If B is a point on the elliptic curve and z is a positive integer, the time complexity of finding z×B is | | group operation. As an example, the required number of operations for calculating ̃× W A is decreased by a factor of with respect to that is required for calculating X R ×W A when ̃ is taken as the half in binary representation of X R .So, if we take into consideration the best value of a through calculating the average computation time in Sender, the Sender used one ECPM with ̃ . Therefore, the Sender requires 5 (ECPM)×83 + 1(ECPM) ×(83/2) = 415+41.5=456.5 ms as the best case.
Also, if we take into consideration the best value of a when calculating the average computation time at the Receiver, the Receiver uses one ECPM with ̃ . Therefore, the Receiver requires 7 (ECPM)×83 + 1(ECPM) ×(83/2) = 581+41.5=622.5 ms as the best case.
As mention in table 2, the Jing's Signcryption scheme is more efficient at the Receiver end which requires 440 ms while the Receiver of our Signcryption scheme requires 664 ms as average case and requires 622.5 ms as the best case. But we provide added functionality such as confidentiality, mutual authentication, integrity, unforgeability, non-repudiation, public verifiability and forward secrecy; while the Jing's Signcryption scheme just provide confidentiality, authentication and non-repudiation [16] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this research we proposed a new scheme that guarantees a secure and efficient communication between devices that have computing power limitations. Our scheme is based using Signcryption scheme to guarantee confidentiality and integrity of communication conducted by mobile devices.
The proposed solution does not depend on using a preestablished Certificate Authorities, it depend on using participants identity to provide the required security services.
Our new Certificateless Signcryption scheme does not depend on modular exponential operations; it is based on using the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for better and efficient delivery of security services. Our Certificateless Signcryption scheme also provides several security services such as, confidentiality, mutual authentication, integrity, unforgeability, non-repudiation, public verifiability and perfect forward secrecy.
